Domesticated animals are commonplace in our lives, but very few people have stopped to question whether the institution is morally acceptable. In this paper, I argue that there are two main moral problems that arise from domestication: there is the inherent immoral nature of the institution itself and then the more pragmatic issue of the property status that is accorded to domesticated animals. I suggest that any attempt to elevate the status of domesticated animals, as seen by theorists such as Kymlicka and Donaldson, ultimately fails to recognise that the institution is itself morally problematic, and thus I argue that abolition is the only acceptable response to the problems. Domestication, even in higher welfare scenarios, is simply another form of animal exploitation, and as such, it should not be perpetuated if we care about animals morally. Towards the end of the paper, I explore some of the common criticisms that the abolitionist position faces, and I demonstrate how none of them provide satisfactory reasoning to reject the position.
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