Emotions have been shown to influence various types of decision-making scenarios, from monetary decisions to moral judgements. Previous research has shown that negative emotions such as regret can affect the types of choices we make in decisions. Once people experience regret, they anticipate this regret in their future choices and change their preference in order to avoid it. However, no studies have directly assessed the influence of anticipated regret on moral decision-making and future choices. The current study aims to examine whether anticipated regret influences moral decisions by causing a change in preference in future choices, and to explore demographic differences in moral choices. Participants answered 14 moral dilemmas with either an action (utilitarian) or inaction (deontological) option. In the experimental group, regret was induced by showing complete feedback of their outcomes, whereas controls experienced no regret. Moral dilemma outcomes were also ranked in order of worst (wished they could change) to best (had an acceptable outcome). Results showed significant gender differences in terms of moral dilemma choice (utilitarian or deontological), but there was no significant effect of age. There was also no effect of group on moral dilemma choice or switching choices (changing preference in future choices). It was found that participants chose the options that had the highest utility (best likelihood of the highest valued item being saved), regardless of whether regret was induced or not. The results suggest that an avoidance of self-blame and responsibility may have caused individuals to feel less regret, therefore, there was no effect on their future moral choices. Anticipated regret also does not deter people from choosing the option that has the greatest likelihood of saving the item with the highest personal value.
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