The law governing negligence claims for psychiatric harm suffered by secondary victims derives from the traditional view that psychiatric injury arises from a ‘nervous shock’. Historical scepticism has resulted in a series of control mechanisms which must be established in order for a claimant to be successful. These outdated hurdles have restricted the availability of damages for psychiatric harm even in certain cases where there has been medical evidence to support the mental suffering. This contradiction of medical evidence has previously been justified on the grounds that it controls the amount of litigation in this area due to an inherent fear of opening up the floodgates to claims. This study will consider these arguably unjust cases as well as a broad range of both legal and medical literature to argue that the law in this area should consider utilising a more liberal approach in order to reflect the modern era.
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