Investigating interdependencies of the sequencing of economic transition, this dissertation focusses on democracy, privatisation, government quality, and the rule of law to understand the interactions between these variables. We find political rights only improves small-scale privatisation, adapting previous literature claiming democracy drives privatisation. Furthermore, both large- and small-scale privatisation improve the rule of law. However, correlations between privatisation and government quality are unclear. All privatisation proxies improve government effectiveness, and competition policy improves all privatisation proxy sizes (large- and small-scale privatisation, and new firm proxies). Yet, only large-scale privatisation improves regulatory quality. Furthermore, political stability influences the rule of law, but the effect (positive or negative) is inconclusive. Moreover, the rule of law and government quality indices all display positive correlations, but sequencing is uncertain. Despite its ambiguous effect, only competition policy influences democracy. Additionally, only regulatory quality and democracy experienced positive relationships. Ultimately, this dissertation provides empirically supported information to aid policy formation for transitioning economies from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy, with analysis built on the ongoing experiences of European and Russian countries.
Keywords: Market Economy, Centrally Planned Economy, Democracy, Privatisation, Rule of Law, Government Quality, Economic Transition, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia
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